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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals is conferred with ]ui.isdjct INH u>"t i
the :i nstant appeal pursuant to Utal i Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e)
(2002).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES VL_STANDARDILJQF REVIEW
1.

Whether the ti^a- :;•,:

. ; <r_ ••-:.-..*_ ^

:•_'•-.

jury so as to both undermine the jury's responsibility to fine t:;e
ultimate facts beyond a reasonable dc^;_*
persuasion to Defendant.

;

...;•:

This issue is raised for the first t: *:ie

on appeal pursuant to plain error,
*

: . •

Jn State \

Minn

, Lue Utah Supreme Court outlined the fo"lowing

principles involved, in determining whether "plain error" ^ : s ; ^ :
In general, to establish the existence of
plain error and to obtain appellate relief
from an alleged error that was not properly
objected to, the appellant must show the
following:
(i) An error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
the appellant, or phrased differently, our
confidence in the verdict is undermined.
iii

il iJ,nh ii'i

decent

Strilt

"

MFM'M

'fnv TIT App 201, 111J5-6,

113 P.3d 998.
Preservation

Issues

ul^L&im^

LLLLatixxi uiiJlLat.emLTiL

involving plain

error

constitute

]

ol Gjxmndt£-.l&z iLe v i eM:

an exception

to

the

preservation rule and as such may be raised for the first time on
appeal.
2.

Whether appointed trial counsel denied Mr. Bennett of

the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel
by

failing

to

object

to

the

trial

court's

proposed

jury

instruction involving the possession of stolen property.

To make

such

counsel

a

showing,

rendered

a defendant

must

show,

first,

a deficient performance, falling below

that

an objective

standard of reasonable professional judgment, and, second, that
counsel's performance was prejudicial.
803 (Utah 1988).
matter of law.

Preservation
Issues

Bundy

v. DeLand,

763 P.2d

The appellate court reviews such a claim as a
State

v.

Maestas,

of Issue Citation

involving

claims

of

1999 UT 32, f20# 984 P.2d 376.

or Statement
ineffective

of Grounds for Review:
assistance

of counsel

constitute an exception to the preservation rule and as such may
be raised for the first time on appeal.

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative,
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant.
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STATEMENT OF T H E C A S E
This case involves the i a j J m e b/ I i I" i h*

I i i ii " J M

i

I

appointed trial counsel to accurately instruct the jury regarding
the law to b e applied in the course of :i t:s d e I i b e z atioi is . The
failure

to instruct

the jury p r e c l u d e d

Mr

Bennett

of a fa i r

trial.
The State charged Mr. Bennett w i t h one count of Burglary, a
second-degree felony, in v i o l a t i o n of U t a h Code Ani i

§ 76 6-202,

.:IL oi Theft, a class B m i s d e m e a n o r , in violation of
Utah

Code

<A'•-*

• •
Mr.

Marcli

Ann

n

^-6-404.

M r . Bennett

appeared

before the

: .- . pleaded not guilty.

Bennett appeared b e f o r e the court

I , , M ], im. I Apiil , , ?«if,4

Mr

for a jury trial on

Bennett did not testify in

his own behalf at trial.
At t l ie cone] us3 :: i i : f ti: :i all , t l le ji ir}r d,el :i b e r a t e d f o r a

little

over two h o u r s a n d then convicted M r . Bennett as charged.
r 1 :i : B e i 11 i e 1 1 w a :i ,;: T e :i 11 i e t :i n t. e f o z s e n t: e n c :i i i g . B a s e d I i p o n t h e
c o n v i c t i o n of Burglary, a second-degree felony, the trial court
s e i I t: e i I c e d I I :i : B e n n e 11: t: a a i i :i i i d e t e r n L i i i a t e t e z n: i o f i i c • t ] e s s 11 I a i i
one year n o r more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison and,
based oi I tl ie coi l!; i cti c i i :)f Theft:

a c l a s s B tin sdemeai io:r , tl ie ti :i al

court sentenced M r . Bennett to a term of 180 d a y s ,
filed a timely p r o se Notice of Appeal oi ) Apr i ] ] 4
3

M r . Bennett

STATEMENT QF FACTS
1.

In the afternoon on November 18, 2003, two individuals

allegedly

burglarized

the Deason home

located

in Layton

(R.

106:102-06).
2.

Sometime thereafter, the State charged Mr. Bennett with

one count of Burglary, a second-degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202, and one count of Theft, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (R. 1-2).
See

R. 1-2, Information, a true and correct copy of which is

attached hereto as Addendum A.
3.

Mr. Bennett

appeared before the district

court

and

pleaded not guilty (R. 11-12).
4.

Mr. Bennett appeared before the court for a jury trial

on March 31, 2004, and April 2, 2004 (R. 24-27 and R. 30-32) .
5.

Through the course of the trial, the State at no time

presented any physical evidence tying Mr. Bennett to the burglary
(R. 106:107:8-17 (lack of fingerprints); R. 106:111:12-17 (lack of
eyewitness identification)).
6.
rested,

The main focus of the State's case against Mr. Bennett
at best, upon the possession of

stolen property

(R.

106:212-13; R. 105:321:18-23).
7.

Mr. Bennett did not testify in his own behalf at trial

(R. 105:279:17-18).
4

8.

In the course of the trial, counsel, met with the trial
h"1 ,<!?'"• :'i-

court and reviewed the proposed jury instruct J L"J it "I
6).

M r . Bennett's appointed trial counsel did not object to the

jury instruetions
9.

(R. 105:276:5-18) .

After presentation of the evidence, the trial court, as

part of the jury instructions, charged the jury with the following
inRtrin-l join -is lii Hit-' possession of stolen p r o p e r t y :
Mere possession of recently stolen property,
if
not
coupled
with
other
inculpatory
or
incriminating circumstances, is not sufficient to
support a conviction for burglary. Possession of
articles recently stolen, however, w h e n coupled
with circumstances inconsistent w i t h innocence,
such as hiding or concealing them, or of making a
false or improbable or unsatisfactory explanation,,
of the possession, may be sufficient to connect
the possessor with the offense and to justify his
conviction for burglary.
In order for the defendant's possession of
recently stolen property to be sufficient to
support a conviction of burglary, such possession
must be recent, that is, not too remote in point
of time from, the crime, personal, exclusive
(although, it may be joint if d e f i n i t e ) , distinct,
conscious, and such possession must be coupled
with a lack of a satisfactory explanation or other
incriminati ng
c i rcumst anc e s
as
menti oned
previously. If these conditions are m e t , then you
may
consider
possession
of
recently
stolen
property, coupled with other inculpatory
or
incriminating
circumstances
as
evidence
of
burglary.
( b<rt

•

] 2

i ] i n:y

Ii isti i :ict::i c i i No

3 3 , a true and

correct copy of which, is attached hereto as A d d e n d u m B.

5

10.

The jury, at the conclusion of trial, deliberated for a

little over two hours, after which it convicted Mr. Bennett as
charged (R. 31; R. 105:326:14-18; R. 77).
11.

Mr. Bennett waived the time for sentencing (R. 105:330-

12.

Based upon the conviction of Burglary, a second-degree

32) .

felony, the trial court sentenced Mr. Bennett "to an indeterminate
term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the
Utah State Prison" and, based on the conviction of Theft, a class
B misdemeanor, the trial court sentenced Mr. Bennett "to a term of
180 days" (R. 31-32) .
13.

Mr. Bennett filed a timely pro se Notice of Appeal on

April 14, 2004 (R. 79).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

By utilizing Jury Instruction No. 33, the trial court

impermissibly instructed the jury so as to both undermine the
jury's

responsibility

to

find

the

ultimate

facts

beyond

a

reasonable doubt and shift the burden of persuasion to Defendant.
Given the lack of qualifying instructions concerning the effect of
the presumption or inference in the instruction, the jury could
have believed that it had to apply the presumption.
the

jury

could

have

believed

that

6

the

quantum

Moreover,
of

evidence

pertaining to the instruction was something less than beyond a
reasonable doubt due to the total lack of explanation concerning
the applicable standard of proof.
The trial court is under a sacred duty to accurately instruct
the jury as to the applicable law.

In the instant case, the trial

court erred by instructing the jury so as to undermine the jury's
responsibility

as

the

fact

finder

and

shift

persuasion to Mr. Bennett, as the Defendant.

the

burden

of

The error should

have been obvious in light of the aforementioned case law both
from the United States Supreme Court and Utah concerning the
effects of such an instruction.
This

error was

harmful

because

the

subject

instruction

undermined the jury's responsibility as the finder of fact and it
shifted the burden of persuasion to Mr. Bennett, as the Defendant,
thereby diminishing the required burden-of-proof standard to be
utilized by the jury in its deliberations.

The harmfulness is

further demonstrated by the focus placed upon the circumstances
surrounding Jury Instruction No. 33 by the State in its case-inchief as well as its closing argument.

Had the jury been properly

instructed or, in other words, absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood that Mr. Bennett would have had a more
favorable

outcome

at

trial.

Based

7

on

the

totality

of

circumstances

surrounding

the

subject

instruction,

one's

confidence in the verdict is significantly undermined.
2.

Appointed trial counsel denied Mr. Bennett of his Sixth

Amendment Right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing
to object to the trial court's proposed jury instruction involving
the possession of stolen property.

Appointed trial counsel's

failure to object to the proposed jury instruction fell below an
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment.

But for

counsel's unprofessional error of failing to object, the result at
trial would have been different.

By objecting to the instruction,

the trial court more likely than not would have corrected the
instruction so as not to undermine the jury's responsibility as
the ultimate fact finder and shift the burden of persuasion to Mr.
Bennett, as the Defendant.

8

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPERMISSIBLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
SO AS TO UNDERMINE THE JURY'S RESPONSIBILITY TO
FIND THE ULTIMATE FACTS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
AND SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION TO DEFENDANT.

As enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in In
Winship,

297 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068

re

(1970), the Due Process

Clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime charged.

Id.

at 364, 90 S.Ct.

at 1073. The Court stated, "Lest there remain any doubt about the
constitutional

stature

of

the

reasonable

doubt

standard,

we

explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged."

Id.;

accord Patterson

v. New York,

432 U.S. 197, 211,

97 S.Ct. 2319, 2327 (1977).
After the close of evidence in the instant case, the trial
court charged the jury with the following instruction as to the
possession by Mr. Bennett of stolen property:
Mere possession of recently stolen property,
if not
coupled
with other
inculpatory
or
incriminating circumstances, is not sufficient to
support a conviction for burglary. Possession of
articles recently stolen, however, when coupled
with circumstances inconsistent with innocence,
such as hiding or concealing them, or of making a
false or improbable or unsatisfactory explanation
of the possession, may be sufficient to connect

9

the possessor with the offense and to justify his
conviction for burglary.
In order for the defendant's possession of
recently stolen property to be sufficient to
support a conviction of burglary, such possession
must be recent, that is, not too remote in point
of time from the crime, personal, exclusive
(although it may be joint if definite), distinct,
conscious, and such possession must be coupled
with a lack of a satisfactory explanation or other
incriminating
circumstances
as
mentioned
previously. If these conditions are met, then you
may consider possession of recently
stolen
property, coupled with other inculpatory or
incriminating
circumstances
as
evidence
of
burglary.
(See R. 53). Not only did Jury Instruction No. 33 undermine the
jury's responsibility as the fact finder, it shifted the burden of
persuasion to Mr. Bennett, as the Defendant.
In State v. Chambers,

709 P.2d 321

(Utah 1985), the Utah

Supreme Court held that an instruction that raises a presumption
of guilt, and thereby impermissibly shifts the burden to the
defendant to prove his innocence, is unconstitutional.
325-27; see

also

State

v.

Smith,

Id.

at

726 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Utah 1986).

Similarly, the jury instruction in question in the case at bar,
Jury Instruction No. 33, raised an impermissible presumption of
guilt.

In fact, by its plain language, the jury may presume or

consider the possession of recently stolen property coupled with
an unsatisfactory explanation of the possession as "evidence of
burglary,."
10

As a threshold inquiry in ascertaining the constitutional
analysis

applicable

to

this

kind

of

jury

instruction,

the

appellate court must determine the nature of the presumption set
forth in the instruction.
Allen,

442 U.S.

See County Court

140, 157-163, 99 S. Ct.

of

Ulster

2213

County

(1979).

v.

Such a

determination requires careful attention to the words actually
spoken to the jury, for whether a defendant has been accorded his
or her constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a
reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction.

Id.

at

157-59, n.16, 99. S.Ct. 2213.
Given the lack of qualifying instructions concerning the
effect of the presumption or inference, the jury could have
believed that it had to apply the presumption.
Johnson,

748 P.2d

1069, 1075

(Utah 1987)

effect of explanatory instruction) .

Cf.

State

v.

(discussing curative

Being told that "you may

consider possession of recently stolen property, coupled with
other inculpatory or incriminating circumstances as evidence of
burglary'' could reasonably be construed as being told that the
matter is presumed with there being no choice as to the effect.
Moreover,

the

jury

could have believed

that

the

quantum of

evidence was something less than beyond a reasonable doubt due to
the total lack of explanation in the instruction concerning the
applicable standard of proof.
11

A reasonable jury could well have interpreted the conditions
outlined in the instruction as an irrebuttable directive of the
court to find intent once convinced of the facts triggering the
presumption.

On the other hand, the jury may have interpreted the

instruction as a direction from the court to find intent upon
proof of the defendant's acts,1 unless the defendant proved the
contrary by
considerably
shifting

some quantum
greater

of proof which may well

than

some

evidence

--

have been

thus

effectively

the burden of persuasion on the element

of intent.

Again, due to the lack of qualifying instructions concerning the
effect of the presumption or inference in Jury Instruction No. 33,
there is a distinct possibility that the jury interpreted the
instruction either of the aforementioned ways.
The trial court is duty-bound to accurately instruct the jury
as to the applicable law.
(Utah 1986) (plurality).

See State

v.

Hansen,

734 P.2d 421, 428

This issue is raised for the first time

on appeal pursuant to plain error.

In State

v. Dunn,

850 P. 2d

1201 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court outlined the following

x

By way of Jury Instruction No. 39, the court instructed the jury
that "[ijntent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof
by direct and positive evidence and may ordinarily
be inferred
from

acts,

conduct,

statement

and

circumstances."

added).
12

(R. 59)

(emphasis

principles involved in establishing "plain error":
In general, to establish the existence of
plain error and to obtain appellate relief
from an alleged error that was not properly
objected to, the appellant must show the
following:
(i) An error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
the appellant, or phrased differently, our
confidence in the verdict is undermined.
Id.

at 1208-09; accord

113 P.3d 998.

State

v.

Larsen,

According to State v.

2005 UT App 201, 1M5-6,

Verde,

770 P.2d 116, 121-22

(Utah 1989), "in most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice'
[found in Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)] is synonymous with the 'plain
error7 standard expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d)

In the instant case, the trial court erred by instructing the
jury in such a manner as to undermine the jury's responsibility as
the fact finder and shift the burden of persuasion to Mr. Bennett,
as the Defendant.

The error should have been obvious in light of

the aforementioned case law both from the United States Supreme
Court and Utah concerning the effects of such an instruction.
This

error

was

harmful

because

the

subject

instruction

undermined the jury's responsibility as the ultimate finder of
fact and it shifted the burden of persuasion to Mr. Bennett, as
the Defendant, thereby diminishing the required burden-of-proof

13

standard to be utilized by the jury in its deliberations.

The

harmfulness is further demonstrated by the focus placed upon the
circumstances surrounding Jury Instruction No. 33 by the State in
both its case-in-chief and its closing argument.

Had the jury

been properly instructed or, in other words, absent the error,
there is a reasonable likelihood that Mr. Bennett would have had
a more favorable outcome.
surrounding

the subject

Based on the totality of circumstances
instruction, one's

confidence

in the

verdict is significantly undermined.

II.

APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED MR. BENNETT OF HIS
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE TRIAL
COURT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION INVOLVING THE
POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY.

The United States Supreme Court, in Strickland

v.

Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984), established a two-prong test
for determining when a defendant's

Sixth Amendment2 right to

effective assistance of counsel has been denied.
S.Ct. at 2064.

Id.

at 687, 104

This test - adopted by Utah courts - requires a

defendant to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment
2

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in
relevant part that xx[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."
14

and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant."
Bundy

v. Deland,

763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); State

899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v.
P. 2d

1113, 1119

(Utah Ct. App. 1995).

v.

Perry,

Wright,

" [T] he right

893
to the

effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the
accused

to receive a fair trial," or, in this case, a fair

sentencing.

Lockhart

v.

Fretwell,

506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct.

838, 842, (1993) .
To satisfy the first prong of the test, a defendant must
"'identify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances,
'show

that

counsel's

representation

standard of reasonableness.'"

State

(Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland,

v.

fell

below

Templin,

an

objective

805 P.2d 182, 186

466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct.

at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)).

A defendant must "overcome

the

counsel

strong

presumption

that

trial

rendered

adequate

assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment."

State

v.

497

Bullock,

791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert,

denied,

U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990).
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a
defendant

must

proffer

sufficient

reasonable probability that, but

evidence

for counsel's

to

support

u

a

unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different."
15

Strickland,
at 187.

466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin,

"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome."
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons
(Utah), cert, denied,
Frame,

805 P.2d

Strickland,

v. Barnes,

466 U.S. at

871 P. 2d 516, 522

513 U.S. 966, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994); State v.

723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).
Appointed trial counsel's failure to object to the court's

proposed Jury Instruction No. 33 fell below an objective standard
of reasonable professional judgment.

This is demonstrated by

existing United States Supreme Court and Utah case law previously
discussed

above

in

Argument

I

and

the

underlying

factual

circumstances of this case.
But for counsel's unprofessional error of failing to research
the proposed instruction and object to it prior to the court
utilizing it to charge the jury, the result at trial would have
been different.

By objecting to the instruction, the trial court

more likely than not would have corrected the instruction so as
not to undermine the jury's responsibility as the ultimate fact
finder and shift the burden of persuasion to Mr. Bennett, as the
Defendant.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Bennett respectfully requests
that this Court reverse his conviction of Burglary and remand the
16

case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with
this Court's instructions as set forth in its opinion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of May, 2007.
JD ^fc WIGGINS, P . C.

17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused
to be mailed by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the
following on this 23rd day of May, 2007:
Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 Soutii, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake jeltyx IXT 84114-0854
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ADDENDA
Addendum A:
Addendum B:
Addendum C:

Information
Jury Instruction No. 33
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment
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Tab A

MELVINC. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
P.O.Box618
800 West State Street
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: (801) 451-4300
Fax:
(801) 451-4328

" ' -'"° I'KTRfcr C(jbR~
.,,
l
^ DEC 22 A II
b
3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.
JACOB BENNETT
DOB: 02/03/1982
Defendant.

Bail
INFORMATION

Case No. 03/%pM£

OTO No.

—

J

f^

The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant,
either directly or as a party, on or about November 18, 2003 at County of Davis, State of Utah,
committed the crimes of:
COUNT 1
BURGLARY, (294) 76-6-202 UCA, a second degree felony, as follows: That at
the time and place aforesaid the defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a dwelling or any
portion of a dwelling with intent to commit: theft.
COUNT 2
THEFT, (327) 76-6-404 UCA, a class B misdemeanor, as follows: That at the
time and place aforesaid the defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the
property of another with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and that the value of said
property was less than $300.
This information is based on evidence obtainedfromwitness Allen Swanson.
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: The undersigned prosecutor is a Deputy
Davis County Attorney and has received information from the investigating officer, Allen

^

Swanson of the Layton Police Department, and the Information herein is based upon such
personal observations and investigation of said officer.
The victim reported that on November 18, 2003 her home was broken into and
several items were stolen, including her checkbook.

Approximately 45 minutes after the

burglary occurred, one of the victim's checks was passed. When the check was passed, a video
surveillance camera recorded the transaction. When this tape was reviewed, defendant was
recognized as the person passing the check.
Authorized December 12,2003 ^ — \
for presentment and filing:
(
/
MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis i^ounty Attorney

V
/ \

Deputy Davis County Attorney
At the time offiling,issuance of a Summons rather than a Warrant of Arrest is requested.

TabB

INSTRUCTION NO. g j * ; 5
Mere possession of recently stolen property, if not coupled with other inculpatory or
incriminating circumstances, is not sufficient to support a conviction for burglary. Possession of
articles recently stolen, however, when coupled with circumstances inconsistent with innocence,
such as hiding or concealing them, or of making a false or improbable or unsatisfactory
explanation of the possession, may be sufficient to connect the possessor with the offense and to
justify his conviction for burglary.
In order for the defendant's possession of recently stolen property to be sufficient to
support a conviction of burglary, such possession must be recent, that is, not too remote in point
of time from the crime, personal, exclusive (although it may be joint if definite), distinct,
conscious, and such possession must be coupled with a lack of a satisfactory explanation or other
incriminating circumstances as mentioned previously. If these conditions are met, then you may
consider possession of recently stolen property, coupled with other inculpatory or incriminating
circumstances as evidence of burglary.

TabC

2nd District - Farmington COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
DAY TWO OF JURY TRIAL
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs,

Case No: 031702062 FS

JACOB BENNETT,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

DARWIN C. HANSEN
April 2, 2004

PRESENT
Clerk:
glendap
Prosecutor: POLL, BRANDON L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): ARRINGTON, C MARKLEY
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: February 3, 1982
Video
Tape Number:
4/2/04
Tape Count: 9.09
CHARGES
1. BURGLARY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/02/2004 Guilty
2. THEFT - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 04/02/2004 Guilty
TRIAL
Plaintiff's Witness, Officer Todd Derrick, is sworn and direct
examination. Plaintiff's Exhibit #8 is offered and received.
TIME: 9:18 AM Cross examination.
TIME: 9:24 AM Re-direct examination.
TIME: 9:27 AM Plaintiff's Witness, Sandra Deason, is sworn and
direct examination.
TIME: 9:36 AM Cross examination.
TIME: 9:38 AM Plaintiff's Exhibits #13, #14 and #12 are offered
and received. Plaintiff will not offer #11, the ring.
TIME: 9:40 AM The jury is excused and the Court is in recess.
TIME: 10:08 AM There are no exceptions to the jury instructions
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Case No: 031702062
Date:
Apr 02, 2004
by either counsel.
TIME: 10:10 AM Defendant's Witness, Mike Otterstrom, is sworn
and direct examination.
TIME: 10:11 AM Cross examination.
TIME: 10:12 AM Re-direct examination.
The defense rests. The State rests. Jury Instructions are given.
Closing arguments by Attorney Poll.
TIME: 11:03 AM Closing arguments by Attorney Arrington.
TIME: 11:27 AM Rebuttal by Attorney Poll.
TIME: 11:47 AM The jury is excused to deliberate.
TIME: 1:59 PM The jury has reached a verdict. The defendant is
found guilty of both counts. The defense wishes to have the jury
polled.
The defendant elects to be sentenced today and waives the 45 days
time to be sentenced.
Restitution to remain open. The State to provide Attorney
Arrington with an amount for restitution. If agreed, then a
stipulation and order to be filed with the court.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the DAVIS County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
To be served concurrent.
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Case No: 031702062
Date:
Apr 02, 2004

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a Class B Misdemeanor,
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s)
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
To be served at the Utah Stat^ Prison. To be served concurrent.
Dated this

day of
\&&-^

District Court Judge
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